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Note
Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel,
And Title VII: Tool Or Trap For
The Unwary?
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 102 S. Ct.
1883 (1982).
Courts can only do their best to determine the truth on the basis of the
evidence, and the first lesson one must learn on the subject of res judicata
is that judicial findings must not be confused with absolute truth. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 19642 to provide a com-
prehensive scheme to battle discrimination. 3 Title VII of the Act4
was enacted to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. This same Act estab-
lished the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)5
to oversee the administration of title VII. While the EEOC has
1. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REV. 281, 315 (1957).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) & (Supp. IV 1980).
3. See Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. AND COM. L. REV. 431
(1966).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352 tit. VII, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 253 (1964),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter
cited as title VIII.
Title VII was passed under unusual circumstances. The Senate bill modi-
fied the version passed by the House. The Senate bill was a compromise
measure hammered out in informal bipartisan conferences and passed with-
out an explanatory report. The House then accepted the Senate's revisions
without exception so there was no Senate-House conference report. See U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGIsLATrvE HISTORY OF TrTLs
VII AND XI OF CrvnL RiGHTs ACT OF 1964 (1968). For a good discussion of the
legislative history of title VII, see Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper
Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. I
REV. 1485 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Jackson].
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 tit. VII, §§ 705-06, 78 Stat. 258, 259
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5 (1976)).
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substantial powers, 6 enforcement of the Act is generally through
private civil action.
A complementary scheme developed among the states with the
implementation of state discrimination laws and the creation of
state agencies to administer these laws. Thus, title VII was imple-
mented with the intent to supplement rather than supplant state
employment discrimination provisions and remedies.7 This inten-
tion is demonstrated by the deferral provisions of title VII,8 which
6. The EEOC is empowered to negotiate with an employer prior to the com-
mencement of civil action by an aggrieved party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)
states:
If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission
shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and
persuasion.
The EEOC then has the authority to sue the employer if the conciliation
efforts fail. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
7. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974), where the Court
noted that in the enactment and amendment to title VII, Congress indicated a
general intent to accord parallel and overlapping remedies against discrimi-
nation. See id. at 47 n.7; infra note 77 and accompanying text. This intent
also applied to other federal discrimination statutes. In Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Court dealt with two federal acts,
title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). The Court held that these two remedies
were in no sense mutually exclusive. Resort to one did not foreclose concur-
rent or subsequent resort to the other. See id. at 461.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) provides:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring
in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or
local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and
establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek
relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with re-
spect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed
under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before
the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced
under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been ear-
lier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be ex-
tended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the
effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the
commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local
authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and
signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based,
the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the
purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by reg-
istered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.
When an employment discrimination charge is filed directly with the
EEOC, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1976), in relevant part, provides:
[T]he Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to
such charge, notify the appropriate State or local officials and, upon
request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days
(provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hun-
dred and twenty days during the first year after the effective day of
1983]
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require the EEOC to defer processing a complaint and to afford the
aggrieved party an opportunity to bring her action under state pro-
ceedings. Under this scheme, it is possible that each employment
discrimination claim will be heard by four separate forums: a state
administrative agency, a state court,9 the EEOC, and finally a fed-
eral court. This situation leads to interesting and complex ques-
tions as to what weight should be afforded the decisions of these
overlapping jurisdictions.10
such State or local law), unless a shorter period is requested, to act
under such State or local law to remedy the practice alleged.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1976).
A complete listing of title VII deferral agencies is contained at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.74 (1980). After the sixty-day deferral period has run, or the state pro-
ceeding has terminated, an individual may bring his complaint before the
EEOC. The EEOC then conducts an investigation to determine whether
there is reasonable cause to believe the discrimination charge is true. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). If the EEOC finds such reasonable cause, it then
begins conciliation efforts to eliminate the unlawful practice. Id. If unsuc-
cessful, the EEOC may initiate its own civil action to enforce the Act. If the
EEOC declines to bring an action, or if it finds no reasonable cause to believe
that a violation has occurred, it must issue the aggrieved party a right to sue
letter notifying that party of its right to commence a civil action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
9. Although there is no deferral provision relating to state courts, a claimant
may appeal the state administrative agency's decision to the state appeals
court. This action was taken by the claimant in Kremer. See infra notes 12-37
and accompanying text. A claimant may also bring a civil action against a
defendant in state court under a state discrimination statute.
10. Congress partially addressed these problems in 1971 and 1972 when the en-
tire enforcement scheme of title VII was subjected to reexamination. This
reexamination led to an amendment to title VII. Part of that amendment pro-
vided that in making a determination of whether there is "reasonable cause"
to believe that there has been unlawful discrimination, the EEOC "shall ac-
cord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by state or local
authorities in proceedings commenced under state or local law .... ." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). While legislative history is silent as to why this
provision was enacted, it was probably out of fear that the EEOC was not
giving enough weight to state findings and orders. Therefore, the substantial
weight criterion should be read as the minimum. While this provision is ad-
dressed to the EEOC, strong arguments are presented by both the commen-
tary and judicial opinion that it should also apply to federal courts. See
Jackson, supra note 4, at 1505; Richards, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: A
Threat to Title VII Rights, 29 A"- L. REv. 129, 161 (1975). Additionally, the
EEOC has interpreted the amendment in its procedural rules by providing
that
(2) "Substantial weight" shall mean that such full and careful con-
sideration shall be accorded to final findings and orders, as de-
fined above, as is appropriate in light of the facts supporting
them, when they meet all of the prerequisites set forth below-
i) The proceedings were fair and regular; and
ii) The remedies and relief granted are comparable in scope to
the remedies and relief required by Federal law; and
iii) The final findings and order serve the interest of the effective
[Vol. 62:384
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Many of the issues concerning the preclusive effects of these
different jurisdictions remain, even though it has been nearly
twenty years since title VII was first enacted. In 1982, the Supreme
Court attempted to settle some of the remaining issues in Kremer
v. Chemical Construction Corp. 11 In Kremer, the Court held that a
charging party loses the right to sue under title VII in federal court
by pursuing a state court review of an adverse deferral agency de-
termination. This decision raises a number of new issues as well
as results which seem antithetical to the purposes and intentions
behind title VIL It also has far-reaching implications for lawyers
who pursue employment discrimination claims and try to ensure
aggrieved parties an opportunity for a de novo judicial hearing on
the merits of their discrimination claims. This decision may set a
trap for the unwary lawyer by foreclosing the opportunity for such
a de novo judicial hearing.
This Note will address the issues raised by the Court in Kremer
as well as outline the effect Kremer will have on legal strategy. It
will also state a proper rule which the Court should have adopted
to avoid some of the problems inherent in its decision.
]I. THE KREMER CASE
A. Facts
In 1973, Ruben Kremer, a fifty-three year old Jewish emigrant
from Poland, applied for employment and was hired by Chemical
Construction Corporation (Chemico) as a piping engineer. He was
the only Jewish employee in his department. On August 1, 1975,
Kremer and a number of other employees were laid off. Some of
these employees in the same job category were later rehired, but
despite the fact that Kremer's supervisor had recognized Kremer's
skills a month before the layoff,12 and despite the fact that Kremer
made repeated applications for advertised openings, Chemico re-
fused to rehire Kremer. Kremer alleged that Chemico had signed
the "anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli Arab boycott"' 3 and that
Chemico's failure to rehire him was the result of a conspiracy
enforcement of Title VIL Provided, that giving substantial
weight to final findings and orders of a "706 Agency" does not
include according weight, for purposes of applying Federal
law, to that agency's conclusions of law.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.19b(e) (2) (1974).
11. 120 S. Ct. 1883 (1982).





against him by his fellow employees on account of his religion.14
In May 1976, Kremer filed a pro se15 discrimination charge with
the EEOC asserting that Chemico had violated title VII by dis-
charging him and subsequently refusing to rehire him because of
his national origin and religion.16 Under the deferral provisions of
title VI,'7 the EEOC referred Kremer's charge to the New York
State Division of Human Rights (NYHRD). Kremer then filed a
complaint with NYHRD charging Chemico with unlawful discrimi-
nation in violation of article 15 of the Executive Law of New York.18
NYHRD was required to undertake prompt investigative action to
determine whether there was probable cause to believe that the
alleged discrimination had occurred.19 The NYHRD investigation
consisted of three interviews. At the first interview, Kremer re-
viewed documents submitted by Chemico and was afforded the op-
portunity to respond to the documents in writing.20 Even though
Kremer met two more times with the agency, he was never af-
forded an adversarial hearing. There was no discovery, no formal
record made, and no representation by counsel.2 1 Thereafter,
NYHRD informed Kremer that there was no probable cause to be-
lieve that Chemico's failure to rehire him was due to the alleged
discrimination. Kremer appealed to the New York State Human
Rights Appeal Board (Appeal Board).22 The Appeal Board af-
14. Brief of Respondent at 3, Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883
(1982).
15. While most complaints are filed pro se with the EEOC, it is significant that
Kremer was without the aid of counsel throughout the entire state court pro-
ceedings. Kremer first had the beneifit of an attorney when he appealed to
the Second Circuit. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of a full and fair opportunity to litigate.
16. Title VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
17. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). See supra note 8 and accom-
panying text.
18. N.Y. Human Rights Law § 296(1) (a), N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296(1) (a) (McKinney
1982) provides:
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) for an em-
ployer or licensing agency, because of the age, race, creed, color, na-
tional origin, sex, or disability, or marital status of any individual, to
refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment
such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compen-
sation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
19. N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 297(2) (McKinney 1982).
20. See Brief of Respondent at 5.
21. See Brief of Petitioner at 4.
22. The Appeal Board is an adjudicatory authority within the Executive Depart-
ment and is independent of NYHRD. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 297a(1) (McKinney
1982). The scope of the Appeal Board's review is limited to determining
whether the order of the division is:
a. in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the state and
the United States;
b. within the division's statutory jurisdiction or authority;
[Vol. 62:384
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firned the decision of NYHRD. Kremer then appealed the deci-
sion of the Appeal Board to the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court.23 The Appellate Division is not a section 706
deferral agency;24 thus, by appealing the Appeal Board's decision,
Kremer stepped outside the EEOC and state administrative
framework of title VII. The Appellate Division unanimously up-
held the determination of the Appeals Board.25
Kremer had renewed his EEOC complaint two days prior to
filing his appeal to the Appellate Division. The EEOC did not con-
duct a separate investigation, but examined NYHRD's findings and
concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe the
charge was true.26 It then issued Kremer a right to sue letter 27 and
informed him that he had a right to pursue the matter in federal
district court. Kremer then ified suit in federal district court.
Before filing an answer, Chemico moved for dismissal of the com-
plaint or summary judgment on the grounds that Kremer's appeal
of the NYHRD decision to the Appellate Division precluded a fed-
eral court action under title VII. The district court denied
Chemico's motion.28 Several months later, the Second Circuit de-
c. made in accordance with procedures required by law or estab-
lished by appropriate rules or regulations of the division;
d. supported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or
e. not arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion
or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 297a(7) (McKinney 1982).
23. Under N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 298 (McKinney 1982), the Appellate Division has au-
thority to enforce, modify, or set aside the order appealed from.
24. See supra notes 8-9.
25. The Appellate Division's resulting affIrmance of the agency's action was a
final judgment on the merits, entitled to preclusive effect under New York
law. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 298 (McKinney 1982); N.Y. Cry. PRAc. LAW § 411 (Mc-
Kinney 1972). See Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 273 (2d
Cir. 1977); Taylor v. New York City Transit Authority, 433 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir.
1970); Riley v. Reed, 45 N.Y. 2d 24, 27, 379 N.E.2d 172, 174, 407 N.Y.S.3d 645, 646
(1978).
26. See Brief of Petitioner at 5.
27. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of title VII
procedures.
28. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 464 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The
court held:
Moreover, the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congres-
sional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his
rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal
statutes.... Accordingly, Title VII actions should not be subject to
the collateral estoppel effects of section 1738 where the result would
be the possible frustration of the congressional objectives embodied
in Title VII, to-wit, the availability of separate federal and state reme-
dies and the independent adjudication of federal claims.
Id. at 473 (citations omitted).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
cided Sinicropi v. Nassau County,29 in which it held that res judi-
cata should apply to actions brought under title VII in federal court
after a state court had rendered a decision which would have been
given preclusive effect in that state. 30 The district court then re-
29. 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979).
30. The Second Circuit was the first circuit to make such a determination. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text. This contrary analysis began with
Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977). In Mitchell,
the plaintiff filed a complaint with NYHRD charging her employer with dis-
crimination pursuant to the New York discrimination laws. NYHRD con-
ducted an investigation of the claim which consisted of two hearings.
NYHRD then dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. The plain-
tiff appealed to the state human rights appeal board. Two weeks later, she
fied a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The appeal board then dis-
missed the complaint. The plaintiff then petitioned the appellate division of
the New York Supreme Court pursuant to the New York rules of civil proce-
dure and the applicable civil rights law. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297-a(7) (Mc-
Kinney 1982); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAw § 7801. (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1976). The
EEOC then dismissed the complaint and issued the plaintiff a right to sue
letter. The plaintiff did not pursue her title VII remedy, but rather, com-
menced an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) in federal district court.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the admin-
istrative and judicial proceedings precluded the section 1981 action. The Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed. The court based its decision on a number of factors.
The first factor was that under the relevant New York state civil rights law, a
plaintiff was required to demonstrate that she "was discharged because of
racial or color discrimination, and not for other reasons. . . ." 553 F.2d at 269
(citations omitted). Therefore, the protection afforded by state law was just
as broad as that afforded by the federal statutes and constitution. The court
found indecisive the fact that the determination was made on the legal merits
without a formal evidentiary hearing stating that "It]he doctrine of res judi-
cata does not depend on whether the prior proceeding was free from error."
Id. at 272. See lB J. MOORE & T. CuRRER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405
[4.-l], at 634-39 (1974). The court then addressed the application of 28 U.S.C
§ 1738 (1976). Under section 1738, the finality accorded the state court's deci-
sion in that state became important. The court concluded that 'there is no
question that a determination of the Appellate Division affirming... [a dis-
missal by NYHRD]... operates as an absolute bar to any other action on the
same facts in the courts of New York." Id. at 273. See supra note 25. There-
fore, the plaintiff was on notice that the decision would foreclose any other
action in the state courts. On this basis, the court concluded that the decision
of the plaintiff to pursue her administrative remedy to a final determination,
which was not imposed by the deferral provision of title VII or any conceiva-
ble exhaustion doctrine applicable to a section 1981 claim, carried the conse-
quences that a federal court would be bound by that state court's decision.
Several months later, the Second Circuit extended this rationale to title VII
in Sinicropi.
The Mitchell decision has spawned a vast amount of comment. See Com-
ment, Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HAY C.P-C.L, L. REv. 33
(1980); Comment, 'Twas a Nibble Not a Bite: Res Judicata and Section 1981,
53 N.Y.U. L REV. 187 (1978); Comment, Employment Discrimination--State
Judicial Procedure Forcloses Federal Remedy Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Mitchell
v. N.B.C., 31 RuTGERS L REV. 973 (1979); Comment, State Court Affirmance of
[Vol. 62:384
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
evaluated Chemico's motion and, since it was bound by the Sin-
icropi decision, begrudgingly overruled its previous decision.3 1
Kremer, represented by counsel for the first time, appealed to the
Second Circuit,3 2 arguing that Sinicropi should be overturned.
The Second Circuit refused Kremer's request.33
As a result of these proceedings, Kremer was precluded from a
de novo judicial hearing on his discrimination claim. His only judi-
cial hearing was an appellate review, in a state court, of a state
administrative agency's decision.34 Kremer did not have an adver-
State Agency Determination of State Discrimination Claim Precludes Subse-
quent Suit in Federal Court Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981-Mitchell v. National
Broadcasting Co., 12 SUFFoLK U.L. REV. 139 (1978). See also Theis, Res Judi-
cata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L.
REV. 859 (1976).
31. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
32. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980).
33. Id. The court held.
This panel cannot properly entertain the claim that Sinicropi was
wrongly decided. In the absence of any decisions by the Supreme
Court or our own court in the brief interval since Sinicropi was de-
cided that would cast doubt on its viability, and none has been called
to our attention, a panel of this court will not overturn a recent deci-
sion of another panel, rendered after full consideration of the very
point at issue. This is something to be done, if at all, only by the full
court sitting en bane.
Id. at 788.
34. When the NYHRD's finding of no probable cause is reviewed, it is measured
either by a "substantial evidence on the whole record" standard, N.Y. ExEc.
LAw § 297-a(7) (d) (McKinney 1982), or by a "not arbitrary, capricious" stan-
dard. Id. § 297-a(7) (e). The substantial evidence standards which mandate
deference to the NYHRD's resolution of factual issues is employed where
there has been a public hearing. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is
employed where there has been no hearing and permits dismissal only where
there has been no evidence to support the complaint. Mayo v. Hopeman
Lumber & Manufacturing Co., supra, 33 A.D.2d 310, 313, 307 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695
(1970); see also Division of Human Rights v. Regional Transit Serv., 79 A.D.2d
1106, 435 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857 (1981); cf. State Div. of Human Rights v. Univ. of
Rochester School of Medicine & Dentistry, 72 A.D.2d 941, 942, 422 N.Y.S.2d 224,
225-26 (1979). The dictum in Speller concerning the NYHRD's authority to
resolve factual disputes pertained to the situation in which there has been a
hearing and in which dismissal will be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence. In the instant case, petitioner had no hearing, and the requirement
of Mayo that the complaint lack merit "virtually as a matter of law" applied.
Since it is not limited to the record, the scope of judicial review under the
"arbitrary and capricious" test is broader than under the "substantial evi-
dence" test and permits the Appellate Division, where the record appears in-
complete, itself to designate a referee or trial term judge to conduct a de novo
hearing. See Gabrielli (Associate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals) &
Nonna, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in New York- An Overview
and Survey, 52 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 361, 371 n.44 (1978); Mandle v. Brown, 5
N.Y.2d 51, 152 N.E.2d 511, 177 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1958); In re Caristro Constr. Corp.,
30 Misc. 2d 185, 221 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. 1961), modified sub nom. Caristro
1983]
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sarial hearing before the NYHRD. Kremer did, however, have the
opportunity for such a hearing. In conducting its investigation,
NYHRD must afford a complainant a full and fair opportunity to
present evidence on the record in support of his claims.35 A claim-
ant may offer his own testimony, the testimony of other witnesses,
and may submit exhibits.36 NYHRD is also empowered to inter-
view the respondent's witnesses, as well as the claimant's, and to
require the respondent to reply to the charge and to produce docu-
mentary evidence.37 By not obtaining an attorney and by not tak-
ing advantage of the procedural opportunities afforded him by
NYIRD, Kremer missed his opportunity for an adversarial hear-
ing on the merits of his discrimination complaint. Kremer could
have avoided this result by abandoning the state administrative
remedies or by not appealing the NYHRD decision to the Appel-
late Division. However, given the majority opinion in Kremer, this
last prerogative may not have guaranteed Kremer a judicial hear-
ing on the merits of his case, and there lies the fault of the majority
opinion.38
B. The Majority Opinion
Prior to Kremer, every federal court, save the Second Circuit,
faced with the issue of whether to give a state court's review of a
state administrative agency decision preclusive effect in federal
court under title VII had answered this question in the negative.39
Constr. Corp. v. Rubin, 15 A.D.2d 561, 222 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1961), affid, 10 N.Y.2d
538, 180 N.E.2d 794, 225 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1962).
35. See State Div. of Human Rights v. New York State Drug Abuse Comm'n, 59
A.D.2d 332, 336, 399 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (1977).
36. See id. Additionally, the complainant is entitled to an opportunity to "rebut
evidence submitted by or obtained from the respondent." N.Y. ExEc. APPEN-
Dix § 465.6(c) (McKinney 1982). See infra note 37.
37. NYHRD's regulations provide that "subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum
may be issued by the designated division officers and employees upon the
application of a party or a party's attorney." N.Y. EXEC. APPENDIX § 465.12(c)
(McKinney 1982). See also id. § 456.6(a)-(c) (rules concerning
investigations).
38. See infra notes 87-107 and accompanying text.
39. See Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1981)
(soundly rejecting Sinicropi); Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333, 336
(3d Cir. 1980) (expressly rejecting Sinicropi); Gunther v. Iowa State's Mens
Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1984 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980)
(questioning Sinicropi); Kralowec v. Prince George's County Md., 503 F.
Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1980); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622
(W.D. Pa. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir.
1980); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 464 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (per
Pierce, J.; decided before Sinicropi); Nickel v. Highway Indus., Inc., 441 F.
Supp. 477 (W.D. Wis. 1977); Gilinsky v. Columbia Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1120(S.D.N.Y. 1977); A1-Hamdani v. State University of New York, 438 F. Supp. 299
[Vol. 62:384
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However, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court afflrmed
the Second Circuit's disposition of the issue. Justice White, writ-
ing for the majority, framed the issue addressed by the Court4O as
"[W]hether Congress intended title VII to supersede the princi-
ples of comity and repose embodied in § 1738."41
(W.D.N.Y. 1977); Benneci v. Department of Labor, 388 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Young v. South Side Packing Co., 369 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1973). See
also Aleem v. General Felt Indus., Inc. 661 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1981) (Sin-
icropi is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1979).).
The commentators have also disagreed with the Second Circuit's rule.
Comment, Restrictions on Access to the Federal Courts in Civil Rights Ac-
tions: The Role ofAbstention and Res Judicata, 6 FoRDHAM URn. L.J. 481, 492-
494 (1978) (same); Comment, Development in the Law - Section 1981, 15
H v. CR. - C.L. L. REv. 29, 266-276 (1980) (criticizing application of Second
Circuit's rule to 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Comment, Civil Rights-Civil Procedure:
State Appellate Court Judgment on Employment Discrimination is Res Judi-
cata in Subsequent Federal Action Under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 62 MINN. L. REV. 987 (1978); Comment, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 973 (1979)
(same); Note, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1978); See Note, Res Judicata in Succes-
sive Employment Discrimination Suits, 1980 U. I. L.F. 1049. See also Jack-
son, supra note 4, at 20 (rejecting application of res judicata when, as in this
case, the state court affirms a state agency finding of no probable cause);
Richards, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: A Threat to Title VII Rights, 29 Ac.
L. REv. 128, 158 (1975) (interpreting title VII contrary to Second Circuit's deci-
sions, but before the relevant Second Circuit cases were decided); Comment,
Civil Procedure-Res Judicata-Challenge of Racial Discrimination Under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 Barred by Prior Submission of Civil Rights Question to State
Court, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1260 (1977).
40. The Court addressed the specific question of "[w]hether a federal court in a
Title VII case should give preclusive effect to a decision of a state court up-
holding a state administrative agency's rejection of an employment discrimi-
nation claim as meritless when the state court's decision would be res
judicata in the state's own courts." 102 S. Ct. at 1888.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) provides: '"e... judicial proceedings of any such
State... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or us-
age in the courts of such State ... ." The Supreme Court has regarded sec-
tion 1738 as invoking the common law rules of preclusion, subject to the full
panoply of established exceptions, rather than establishing any "more strin-
gent" doctrine. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). Therefore, the prior
state court's decision will not be afforded preclusive weight if there has not
been a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, Allen, 449 U.S. at 95; Mon-
tana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,328-29 (1971), if there is reason to
doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of the procedures followed in the
prior litigation, 440 U.S. at 164 n.11, or if there are countervailing statutory
policies which may warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion.
Id. at 155; Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979). These points are all
significant in that Kremer sought to rely on them in arguing that a prior state
court review of a state administrative agency's decision should not preclude
him from a trial de novo in federal court. Courts have refused to apply the
traditional preclusion doctrines in cases involving issues subject to exclusive
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Justice White began by stating: "Section 1738 requires federal
courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments
that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from
which the judgments emerged."42 Since under New York law the
judgment of the Appellate Division would preclude Kremer from
bringing any other action based on his discrimination complaint in
New York courts, if section 1738 applied, he would be precluded
from bringing an action in federal court.43 Kremer advanced two
principal arguments against the application of section 1738 in this
case. The first argument was that under title VII, Congress in-
tended that federal courts be relieved of their usual obligation to
grant finality to state court decisions.44 Second, he asserted that
the New York administrative and judicial proceedings in this case
were so deficient that they should not be entitled to preclusive ef-
fect in federal court and, in any event, the rejection of a state em-
ployment discrimination claim cannot by definition bar a title VII
action.45
In addressing the first argument, Justice White, citing Allen v.
McCurry,4 6 stated that "an exception to section 1738 will not be
federal jurisdiction and federal habeas corpus actions. See Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953) (federal habeas corpus); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433
(1940) (federal bankruptcy); Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 222 F.2d
184, 188-89 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955) (antitrust treble
damages action).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 1889.
43. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 300 (McKinney 1982). See also 102 S. Ct. at 1890.
44. 102 S. Ct. at 1890.
45. Id.
46. 449 U.S. 90 (1980). In Allen, a policeman arrested the plaintiff after a gun
battle. Upon entering the house, the police seized evidence both in plain
view and hidden. The trial court suppressed the evidence seized from
dresser drawers and automobile tires, but denied suppression of the evi-
dence found in plain view. Subsequently, the plaintiff, McCurry, filed an ac-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for one million dollars in damages for an
alleged conspiracy to violate his fourth amendment rights. He filed the law-
suit against the arresting officers. The district court, apparently understand-
ing the gist of the complaint to be the alleged unconstitutional search and
seizure, granted summary judgment holding that collateral estoppel pre-
vented McCurry from relitigating the search and seizure question already de-
cided against him in the state courts. The court of appeals reversed on the
grounds that under § 1983, the federal courts were McCurry's only route to a
federal forum for his constitutional claim and directed the trial court to allow
him to proceed to trial unencumbered by collateral estoppel.
The issue addressed by the Court was one of first impression. The Court
framed the issue as whether the unavailability of federal habeas corpus pre-
vented the police officers from raising the state court's partial rejection of
McCurry's constitutional claim as a collateral estoppel defense to the § 1983
suit against them for damages.
The Court concluded that nothing in the language or legislative history of
section 1983 proved any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state
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recognized unless a later statute contains an express or implied
partial repeal."47 Since there was no indication that title VII ex-
pressly repealed section 1738, any such repeal must be implied.
Justice White then concluded that title VII did not fall into either
of the two well-settled categories4 8 of repeal by implication. In
reaching this decision, Justice White reviewed the language and
application of title VII as well as its legislative history. There are
no provisions of title VII which require claimants to pursue in state
court an unfavorable state administrative action. The Act also
does not specify the weight a federal court should afford a final
judgment by a state court if such a remedy is sought. While the
Court had previously "interpreted the 'civil action' authorized to
follow consideration by state and federal administrative agencies
to be a 'trial de novo,"' 49 Justice White stated that "neither the
court's judgment or decision when the state court, acting within its proper
jurisdiction, had given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
federal claims, and thereby had shown itself willing and able to protect fed-
eral rights. Therefore, there was no congressional intent to provide a person
claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue al-
ready decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state pro-
ceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged at all. Id. at 420.
Therefore, the Court, holding that the court of appeals had erred in conclud-
ing that McCurry's inability to obtain federal habeas corpus relief under his
fourth amendment claim rendered the doctrine of collateral estoppel inappli-
cable to a section 1983 suit, reversed and remanded.
47. 102 S. Ct. at 1890.
48. These two categories are:
"(1) where the provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable con-
flict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it
will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. But, in either
case, the intention of the legislature must be clear and manifest..."
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. at 154, 96 S. Ct., at 1993,
quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503,56 S. Ct. 349,
352, 80 L.Ed. 351 (1936).
102 S. Ct. at 1890.
49. 102 S. Ct. at 1891. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844-45 (1976); Al-
exander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1974); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973). The Court distinguished Gardner-
Denver, in which it had held that final responsibility for enforcement of title
VU is vested with federal courts. 415 U.S. at 44. The Court held-
We did not say, and our language should not be read to imply, that by
vesting "final responsibility" in one forum, Congress intended to
deny finality to decisions in another. The context of the statement
makes this clear. In describing the operation of Title VII, we noted
that the EEOC cannot adjudicate claims or impose sanctions; that
responsibility, the "final responsibility for enforcement," must rest in
federal court. ... [Airbitration decisions, of course, are not subject
to the mandate of § 1738. Furthermore, unlike arbitration hearings
under collective bargaining agreements, state fair employment prac-
tice laws are explicitly made part of the Title VII enforcement
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statute nor our decisions indicate that the final judgment of a state
court is subject to redetermination at such a trial."50 The majority
then clarified the meaning of the "substantial weight" requirement
of title VII,51 stating that it only indicates "the minimum level of
deference the EEOC must afford state administrative determina-
tions; it does not bar affording the greater preclusive effect which
may be required by § 1738 if judicial action is involved." 52 In re-
viewing the legislative history of title VII, Justice White concluded
that there was nothing to support the proposition that "Congress
considered it necessary or desirable to provide an absolute right to
relitigate in federal court an issue resolved by a state court." 3 The
majority also concluded that the comity and federalism interests
embodied in section 1738 were not compromised by applying the
preclusion doctrines to title VII cases.5 4
The majority refuted the contention that their decision would
result in a deterioration in the quality of state administrative pro-
cedures, reasoning that stripping state court judgments of finality
would be far more destructive to the quality of adjudication by les-
sening the incentive for full participation by the parties and for a
searching review by state officials.5 5 Such a result would reduce
the incentive for states to work toward effective and meaningful
discrimination systems.
Justice White then divided Kremer's second argument into two
parts: (1) the New York courts did not resolve the issue that the
federal district court would resolve under title VII, and (2) the pro-
scheme. Our decision in Gardner-Denver explicity recognized the
"distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights."
... Here we are dealing with a state statutory right, subject to state
enforcement in a manner expressly provided for by the federal Act.
102 S. Ct. at 1891. The Court also distinguished the inadequacies of arbitra-
tion as compared to state authorities which are charged with enforcing the
laws and state courts which are charged with interpreting the law.
50. 102 S. Ct. at 1891 (emphasis in original).
51. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(b) (1976). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
52. 102 S. Ct. at 1891. The court also stated:
Nor is it plausible to suggest that Congress intended federal courts to
be bound further by state administrative decisions than by decisions
of the EEOC. Since it is settled that decisions of the EEOC do not
preclude a trial de novo in federal court, it is clear that unreviewed
administrative determinations by state agencies also should not pre-
clude such review even if such a decision were to be afforded preclu-
sive effect in a state's own courts.
Id. at 1891 n.7. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
53. 102 S. Ct. at 1893. This conclusion was contrary to what most lower courts had
decided when faced with the issue. See supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
54. 102 S. Ct. at 1895.
55. This point was subject to severe criticism in Justice Blackmun's dissent. See
infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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cedures accorded Kremer were inadequate.56 The Court quickly
disposed of Kremer's first contention by stating that the alleged
discriminatory acts asserted by Kremer were prohibited by both
New York and federal law. Thus, when the Appellate Division af-
firmed NYHRD's dismissal, it necessarily decided that Kremer's
claim was meritless under New York law and equally meritless
under title VH.57
The majority next addressed the second part of Kremer's argu-
ment and the "more serious"5 8 issue confronted by the Court: the
procedural adequacy of the previous proceedings. This contention
is important in reconciling the proposition that in order for a party
to be collaterally estopped from litigating an issue, there must
have been a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate that issue in the
prior proceeding.59 The Court clarified the meaning of the "full
and fair opportunity" proposition by stating:
Our decisions have not specified the source or defined the content of the
requirement that the first adjudication offer a full and fair opportunity to
litigate. But for present purposes, where we are bound by the statutory
directive of § 1738, state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the
minimal procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause in order to qualify for the full-faith-and-credit guaranteed
by federal law.6
0
Reviewing the procedures afforded Kremer, the Court concluded
that the "panoply of procedures, complimented by administrative
as well as judicial review was sufficient under the Due Process
Clause."61
56. See 102 S. Ct. at 1896.
57. The Court, in refuting the dissenters' contention that there was no finding
one way or the other on the merits of Kremer's claim, stated: "When the
NYHRD summarily dismisses a complaint, the appellate division must find
that the petitioner's 'complaint lacks merit as a matter of law."' 102 S. Ct. at
1896 n.21.
58. 102 S. Ct. at 1897.
59. The Court acknowledged this proposition citing to previous cases in which
the proposition had been stated or relied upon. See 102 S. Ct. at 1897 (citing
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 153 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971)). This proposition has previously been used in the
application of collateral estoppeL However, neither the lower courts nor the
Supreme Court discussed whether the doctrine of res judicata or collateral
estoppel applied to Kremer's case. The Court clarified the application of the
doctrine by stating that "it is clear from what follows that invocation of res
judicata or claim preclusion is subject to the same limitation [i.e., the full and
fair opportunity limitation]." Id. at 1897 n.22. The Court continued by stating
that Kremer may be precluded under res judicata from pursuing a title VII
claim, but in any event, "it [was] undebatable that [Kremer was] at least
estopped from relitigating the issue of employment discrimination arising
from the same events." Id.
60. 102 S. Ct. at 1897.
61. Id. at 1899.
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The majority concluded that the usual rule in our judicial sys-
tem is that once the legal merits of a claim have been decided by a
court of competent jurisdiction, they are not subject to redetermi-
nation in another forum. Since the provisions and legislative his-
tory of title VII did not override the rules of preclusion as
statutorily applied to federal courts, and since Kremer had been
afforded a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the merits of his
claim, he was precluded from bringing his claim in federal district
court by the previous state appellate court decision.
C. The Dissent
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall joined, delivered a rousing dissent to the majority opin-
ion. The dissent interpreted the statutory language of title VII in
opposition to that of the majority. The dissent noted that a com-
plainant could bring a title VII suit in federal court despite the con-
clusion of state proceedings. The word proceedings was
interpreted to refer to "both state agency proceedings and state
judicial review of those agency proceedings." 62 Therefore, the dis-
sent reasoned that since state court review was merely the last
step in the administrative process, such review should not have
preclusive effect in federal court.
The dissent properly focused on the major weakness in the ma-
jority opinion. This weakness, characterized as the majority's
"schizophrenic reading of § 706(b),"63 was the reading of that pro-
vision by the majority to mean that state administrative proceed-
ings would not preclude a trial de novo in federal court, but that a
limited state court review affirming those same administrative pro-
ceedings would have such an effect. The dissent reached this con-
clusion because in affirming the administrative agency's decision,
the reviewing court finds only that the agency's conclusion "Was a
reasonable one and thus may not be set aside by the courts al-
though a contrary decision 'may have been reasonable and also
sustainable.' "64 Thus, the dissenters concluded that the majority
was giving preclusive effect to a state administrative agency's deci-
sion in contravention to the legislative intent behind title VII.
The dissent also concluded that the majority had abrogated the
legislative intent of title VII in two other ways. First, the Court had
62. Id. at 1901 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1902-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State
Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52 N.Y.2d 72, 79, 417 N.E.2d 525, 436 N.Y.S.2d 231,
235 (1980) (quoting Mize v. State Division of Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d 53, 56,
N.E.2d 231, 233, 49 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (1973))).
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usurped a role given to the EEOC by Congress. That role is the
task of determining whether state procedures are adequate. The
EEOC accomplishes this task by signing work-sharing agree-
ments 65 with the state agencies, foreclosing any subsequent fed-
eral suits if the EEOC determines that minimal due process in
agency procedures justified barring subsequent title VII suits
when that state agency's decision had been affirmed by a state
court. Second, the dissent noted that "[iun Title VII, Congress
wanted to assure discrimination victims more than due process; it
wanted them to have the benefit of a vigorous effort to eliminate
discrimination."66 Therefore, by affording some claimants less
than this vigorous effort, the majority's position contravened the
congressional intent behind title VII.
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that "Congress
intended the claimant to have at least one opportunity to prove his
case in a de novo trial in court."67 Therefore, the Appellate Divi-
sion's decision should have been considered part of the proceed-
ings and only afforded substantial weight by the federal courts
under title VII.
The dissent also raised several policy considerations which
would weigh against the majority's decision. These considerations
are properly considered in the following section.
III. ANALYSIS
The application of the preclusion doctrines6 8 is often a complex
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (1976). The original version of this provision was
designed to enable the EEOC to enter into work-sharing agreements with a
state giving that state exclusive jurisdiction. Such a provision would be ap-
plicable to states which were deemed to have adequate state discrimination
laws. Under this agreement, the EEOC would decline to hear the charge and
the complainant could not file an action in federal court. See H.R. 7152, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 708(b) (1964). However, the Senate version of the bill, which
provides that the EEOC can enter into work-sharing agreements with state
agencies and those agencies have the initial opportunity to resolve the claim,
does not give the state exclusive jurisdiction. Nothing in the present Act pre-
vents a complainant from bringing a federal claim. The EEOC may decline to
process a charge under a work-sharing agreement, but the complainant may
still file with the EEOC after the 60-day deferral period. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-
5(c) (1976). Since the EEOC may be bound by the work-sharing agreement,
the complainant can then bring a suit in federal court 180 days after filing
with the EEOC.
66. 102 S. Ct. at 1906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67. 102 S. Ct. at 1912 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Preclusion is the new term encompassing the doctrines of res judicata or
claim preclusion and collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. This new
terminiology has been adopted by the American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1 (1982). For a discussion on the evolution of res
judicata terminology, see 18 C. WiuGIrr, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
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and critical issue in title VII suits. These issues can arise in a mul-
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (1982). The policy behind preclusion gener-
ally is to promote judicial finality, "to secure the peace and repose of society
by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination so that there
shall be a termination of litigation and the participants not vexed twice for
the same cause." 1B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.405[3], at 631 (2d ed. 1982) (citations omitted).
The doctrine of preclusion actually consists of two separate doctrines:
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion prevents relitigation
of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery on the same claim that was previ-
ously available to the parties, regardless of whether the claims were asserted
in the initial litigation. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980); Cleary,
Res Judicata Re-examined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948); Degnan, Federalized Res
Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976); Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judg-
ment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MIH. L. REV. 1723 (1968).
The term claim preclusion also includes the doctrines of merger and bar.
Merger applies when a judgment is rendered for the plaintiff while bar ap-
plies when judgment is for the defendant. When a final judgment is rendered
in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot maintain a subsequent action on
any part of the original claim since the action is said to have "merged" into
the original judgment. A judgment in favor of the defendant is said to bar all
subsequent actions on any part of that claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 18-19 (1982). See also Note, Res Judicata in Successive Em-
ployment Discrimination Suits, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 1049, 1054 n.34 (1980); Note,
Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State
Court Determinations, 57 VA. L. REV. 1360 (1967).
The limiting factor in defining the scope of claim preclusion is the defini-
tion of claim. See A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/CLAIM PRECLUSION 43-48 (1969).
Both Vestal and the American Law Institute use the term "claim" instead of
the traditional and more restrictive term "cause of action." The modern term,
"claim," has been given a broad meaning to effectuate the purposes behind
preclusion. This definition encompasses the notion that relitigation of claims
arising out of the same transaction which were not initially raised will be
precluded from being litigated in a subsequent action. There have been at
least three definitions of claim or cause of action. The first, and narrowest,
would define claim as a single remedial right and would permit as many law-
suits as one could devise legal theories. The second would define claim as a
single breach of a primary duty, and the third, and broadest, would define a
claim on the basis of a unit of operative facts. See F. JAMES, CrviL PROCEDURE
§ 11.10, at 553-54 (1st ed. 1965). The American Law Institute has endorsed the
broadest definition of claim in what it terms the "transactional test." Under
this test, the definition of claim embraces all the remedial rights of the plain-
tiff against the defendant arising out of the relevant transaction. Transaction
is defined as a grouping of facts on the basis of whether the facts are related
in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether they form a convenient unit
and that unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understand-
ing or usage. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1980). See
Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CM. L. REv. 317, 340-41
(1978).
Issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues which have been actually and
necessarily determined in a prior proceeding, regardless of whether the same
claim was involved. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27-29
(1980). One limiting factor in the application of issue preclusion is the notion
that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted must have had a "full
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titude of different settings since employment discrimination
claims can be brought in front of a number of different forums and
under a number of different theories and statutes. 69
Title VII cases present some unique considerations for the ap-
plication of preclusion. These considerations arise because there
is an inherent discrepancy within title VII. This discrepancy is il-
luminated by analyzing the policies behind title VII. One of the
purposes behind the Act is the upgrading of state and local efforts
to combat discrimination.7 0 This policy is demonstrated by the
deferral provisions of title V]1.71 Nevertheless, an inherent dis-
trust of state proceedings is demonstrated by the substantial
weight directive to the EEOC.72 This distrust is in conflict with the
basic premise of upgrading state proceedings, and any rule
promulgated in the area of preclusion should attempt to alleviate
this conflict. The more coherent rule and the one espoused by the
dissent in Kremer would promote this objective.73
Before delving into the effects of Kremer, a brief summary of
preclusion as it is generally applied under title VII is necessary. 74
This section is important in demonstrating the attitude of the
courts and their reluctance to affirm any rule which would bar a
plaintiff from asserting his title VII claim in federal court.
A. Preclusion and Title VII
The clearest application of preclusion in a discrimination suit is
when a plaintiff simply refiles his claim in the court which had pre-
viously dismissed the claim.75 Preclusion readily applies and the
plaintiff is barred from bringing the second suit.
A less clear situation occurs when a plaintiff seeks redress for
discrimination under statutes and theories other than title VII
and fair opportunity" to litigate that issue in the prior proceeding. Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5) (1980). A second limita-
tion occurs when the initial action was deficient in the quality and extensive-
ness of its procedures. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3)
(1980).
69. See Note, Res Judicata in Successive Employment Discrimination Suits, 1980
U. ILL. L.F. 1049 (1980).
70. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980); see also, Jack-
son, supra note 4, at 1499.
71. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. This proposition is also demon-
strated by the work-sharing agreements. See supra note 65.
73. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 75.
75. See Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 946 (1976).
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prior to initiating a title VII claim.7 6 For example, a plaintiff may
be under a contractual obligation to raise such a claim in a contrac-
tual setting as in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.77 There, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an employee's stat-
utory right to a trial de novo under title VII was foreclosed by prior
submission of his claim to final arbitration under a nondiscrimina-
tion clause in a collective bargaining agreement. The Court held
that an arbitrator's decision would not preclude a plaintiff from his
statutory right to a trial de novo. The Court stated that ultimate
authority for the enforcement of title VII rested in the federal
courts and that the provisions of the Act "make plain that federal
courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance
with title VII."78 This language had been taken literally with
courts uniformly denying the preclusive effect of any prior deci-
sion not decided in a federal court until the Second Circuit's appli-
cation of preclusion to state court decisions under title VHI7 9
Courts have likewise refused to give preclusive effect to deci-
sions rendered under other federal statutes. 80 In Tipler v. E.I. du-
Pont deNemours & Co.,81 the plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. Two days later, he filed a charge
with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging in gen-
eral terms that he had been terminated in violation of sections
8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3)82 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
After an extended evidentiary hearing, the NLRB trial examiner
found that the plaintiff had been lawfully discharged. The NLRB
76. This situation is faced by virtually all title VII claimants since the deferral
provisions essentially require filing a claim under a state statute. See supra
note 8 and accompanying text.
77. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
78. Id. at 45.
79. See Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983
(1979). See supra note 39 for cases holding contrary to Sinicropi.
80. See Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969) (no preclusive
effect to prior action brought under the Railway Labor Act). The Court has
not specifically decided on the application of preclusion to prior suits decided
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1976). However, in Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Court held that title VII prerequisites
and procedures were not applicable to section 1981 actions. In the view of at
least one commentator, the Supreme Court pronouncements in Johnson and
Gardner-Denver would probably lead to no preclusive effect given the prior
action. See Note, Res Judicata in Successive Employment Discrimination
Suits, 1980 U. ILT.. LF. 1049, 1093 (1980). The Equal Pay Amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1) (1976), expressly included ex-
ceptions to the Act into title VII.
81. 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971). See also Washam v. J.C. Penney Co., 519 F. Supp.
544 (D. Del. 1981); Willis v. Chicago Extruded Metals Co., 358 F. Supp. 888
(N.D. Ill. 1973).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3) (1976).
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affirmed. The employer then contended that the employee should
be barred from asserting the discrimination claim under title VII
because of the previous litigation under the NLRA. Although the
preclusion doctrines generally apply to administrative agency ad-
judication,8 3 the court refused to apply them in this case. The
court stated that because of the variant standards between the la-
bor laws and title VII and because different factors are often con-
sidered, the plaintiff was entitled to a trial de novo on the title VII
claim.
The proposition that federal agency decisions should not be
given preclusive effect in federal court for suits brought under title
VII has also been applied to state administrative agency adjudica-
tions of employment discrimination claims84 even where the ad-
ministrative agency decision would have been given preclusive
effect by that state.85 This conclusion has been left undisturbed by
the Kremer decision. The next logical question is what effect
should be given a state court's review of these administrative deci-
sions. This was the question addressed in Kremer. The Court's
answer has very far-reaching effects, perhaps recognized by the
Court but not properly considered.
B. The Effect of Kremer
The rule enunciated in Kremer is that a federal court must ap-
ply a state's preclusion rules to a state court's decision.86 The pri-
mary effect of Kremer should be to reinforce the principle of
comity, as well as the principles of finality and repose in the appli-
cation of preclusion 87 in the state-to-federal context. A second sig-
83. In United States v. Utah Constr. and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), the
Supreme Court held that an agency's determination can be given either res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect so long as the agency acted in its judicial
capacity and properly resolved the issues, and the parties involved had an
adequate opportunity to litigate the claim or issue. See Note, Collateral Es-
toppel Effect ofAdministrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 65 (1977).
84. See Sinouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333, 336 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 966 (1980); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079,
1084 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 966 (1980); Batiste v. Furnco Constr.
Corp., 503 F.2d 447,450 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975); Cooper
v. Phillip-Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9, 11 (6th Cir. 1972); Vootsis v. Union Carbide
Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 894 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972). These
proceedings range from purely administrative investigations performed by
understaffed state agencies to full scale adversarial hearings conducted
before highly competent administrative tribunals and courts. See Jackson,
supra note 4, at 1505.
85. See 102 S. Ct. at 1890-91.
86. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 54.
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nificant effect of Kremer is the interpretation of the "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" standard under section 1738.88 Third,
Kremer defined when the mandate of section 1738 will be overrid-
den. The Court held that section 1738 will only be overridden when
the federal statute expressly or impliedly repeals section 1738.89
These propositions in themselves have significance to the employ-
ment discrimination attorney.
A positive effect of the Kremer rule is that it establishes a rela-
tively easy standard for federal courts to apply. They need only
determine the preclusion rules of the state concerning judicial re-
view of an administrative agency's decision and apply those rules
if they satisfy minimum standards of due process.90 Therefore, the
procedures available to a litigant in state court must be reviewed;
the fact that the litigant chose not to take advantage of them will
be of no consequence. 91 One effect of this decision, however, will
be to force litigation at the pleadings stage in federal court over
how full and fair the opportunity to litigate the discrimination
claim was at the state court level. In Kremer, the majority referred
to the "substantive" or "merits" review that the New York courts
gave to challenges of no probable cause. However, if the court re-
view is limited to an "abuse of discretion" standard alone, the
question is raised as to whether there was actually a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" the substantive issue.
The majority opinion may also lead to other adverse results.
One such result would be an undermining of state procedures.
This would occur when plaintiffs, for fear of being precluded from
federal court, abandon state court review of state administrative
agency decisions and pursue their claims de novo in federal
court.92 This strategy would be especially prevalent for plaintiffs
who lost before the state administrative agency. However, winning
plaintiffs would also arguably opt for a federal de novo hearing if
they felt that the state court would not treat them as well as a fed-
eral court. Such plaintiffs would probably prefer appointed federal
judges who are arguably more detached than elected state judges.
In addition, the choice of federal court review is aided by the broad
discovery rules and the ability to subpoena witnesses available in
a federal court hearing. Thus, the policy of comity, embodied in
88. See supra notes 59 and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. 102 S. Ct. at 1897-98.
91. The Court stated that "[tihe fact that Mr. Kremer failed to avail himself of
the full procedures provided by state law does not constitute a sign of their
inadequacy." 102 S. Ct. at 1899.
92. The dissent stated: "The lesson of the Court's ruling is: An unsuccessful state
discrimination claimant should not seek state judicial review." 102 S. Ct. at
1909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
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section 1738, may be contravened since, in the words of the dis-
senters, "the Court effectively has eliminated state reviewing
courts from the fight against discrimination in an entire class of
cases."93 Therefore, absent review by state courts to correct
agency mistakes, the quality of state agency decisionmaking may
deteriorate. This conclusion is in direct conflict with the goal of
title VII to enhance and complement state discrimination laws.94
Thus, Kremer will have the effect of forcing plaintiffs to proceed
only as far as the state administrative agency. It will also diminish
the availability of multiple and independent remedies 95 and would
put discriminatees to a forced choice of forums not contemplated
by Congress.
A second adverse effect of Kremer may be to set a trap for the
unwary. This concern is especially prevalent for the "unwary pro
se or poorly represented claimant."96 Since state agencies are
often underbudgeted and understaffed, such an agency may give a
discrimination charge "less than the close examination it would re-
ceive in federal court."97 On review in the state court, the "nature
of the agency's deliberations combined with deferential judicial re-
view may lead to discrimination charges receiving less careful con-
sideration than Congress intended when it passed Title VII."98
Therefore, an unwary plaintiff may be effectively precluded from
any effective hearing on the merits of his claim, as was Kremer. In
addition, as is demonstrated in the following discussion, a plaintiff
may be forced to take drastic measures to assure that he is not
precluded from a federal court hearing.
An unwary plaintiff may be precluded from federal court review
depending on whether a state court review of an administrative
agency's decision will have preclusive effect when that decision is
appealed to state court by the defendant. The majority did not
specifically address this issue. However, the dissent recognized
the issue and stated that its effect would be to force a plaintiff into
making every effort to prevent the state agency from reaching a
final decision.99 Failure to do so would result in his adversary
seeking judicial review and effectively preventing a de novo hear-
ing in federal court on the merits of the discrimination claim.
While there has been language in circuit court decisions which
93. 102 S. Ct. at 1909.
94. See -upra note 10 and accompanying text. See also New York Gaslight Club
Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (state and federal cooperation is a goal of title
VII).
95. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
96. 102 S. Ct. at 1910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1909 n.18.
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would circumvent such a result, 100 the Supreme Court did not fo-
cus on such a distinction. The dissent prophesied that in such a
case, given the Kremer decision, no complainant could safely pre-
dict that the court would not apply section 1738. Such a result is
likely given the majority's adherence to preclusion doctrines and
its mandate to federal courts to apply the rules of preclusion cho-
sen by the rendering state.
The Kremer decision has thus afforded a broad bar to federal
court involvement in title VII cases, a result not likely to have been
approved by Congress. In addition, it adds another layer of com-
plexity to an already complex and confusing area of law.
C. The Proper Rule
The dissent states the more coherent rule of preclusion for title
VII cases in the state-to-federal context.' 0 ' Under the dissent's
rule, no preclusive effect would be given to a state court's review of
a state administrative agency's decision. Rather, the state court's
review could be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as
the court deemed appropriate.102 Such a rule would not surprise
an unknowing plaintiff who seeks to vindicate his rights in federal
court as they appear to be granted by title VII. However, preclu-
sive effect would be given to a state court's trial on the merits of
the discrimination claim.'0 3 Therefore, the policies underlying sec-
tion 1738 would not be frustrated; comity would be promoted by
not forcing a plaintiff to abandon his state administrative remedy
and by not precluding state court review of the administrative
agency's ruling. 0 4 The principle of repose would not be violated
100. The Second Circuit emphasizes that "[t]he crucial factor is that appellant
chose to submit her cause to the state courts for review." Sinicropi v. Nassau
County, 601 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979).
101. See 102 S. Ct. at 1910-11.
102. This result was reached by all of the courts considering the issue except the
Second Circuit. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The rationale be-
hind such a rule is that when Congress used the word "proceeding" in its
"substantial weight" directive to the EEOC, it meant state court decisions as
well as state administrative agency decisions. The dissent asserts that this
directive should also apply to the federal courts. Under such a rule, the
anomalous result of not giving preclusive effect to a full blown adversarial
hearing at the administrative agency level and giving preclusive effect to a
state court review of that agency's decision would be avoided. See 102 S. Ct.
at 1900-01.
103. 102 S. Ct. at 1911. This result was reached in Moosavi v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Educ., 666 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1981), where the court had no difficulty distin-
guishing a state court's trial on the merits of a discrimination claim from a
state court's affirmance of a state administrative agency's decision.
104. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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since a plaintiff would be precluded from having two de novo judi-
cial hearings on the merits of his discrimination claim.
In addition, this rule would not contravene the mandate of sec-
tion 1738 since that section has been held subject to well-defined
federal policies which may compete with the policies underlying
the statute.105 The dissent renders a well-reasoned and compelling
argument as to why such a federal policy exists behind title VII.106
The one drawback of this rule would be that a well-advised
plaintiff could get two bites of the apple, that is, he could receive a
full blown adversarial hearing at the state administrative agency
level as well as in federal court. But, it is important to note that
under the majority rule such a result could also occur. A plaintiff
could receive a full blown hearing at the agency level and by not
appealing to the state court, receive another hearing in federal
court. Therefore, the dissent's rule would not hinder the overall
efficiency of the system any more than the majority's rule
promises to do.
IV. CONCLUSION
The issue faced by the Court in Kremer is a very difficult issue
to solve properly. There are good policy arguments for and against
both the majority's and the dissent's rules. However, an under-
standing of Kremer and its implications are of vital importance to
civil rights and labor attorneys. The rule of Kremer could set a
trap for the unwary and preclude a plaintiff from ever having a
hearing on the merits of his or her discrimination claim. A full
blown adversarial hearing is important to a plaintiff alleging em-
ployment discrimination. Employment discrimination is often
subtle and indirect, and the evidence needed to prove a discrimi-
nation claim is often complex and in the hands of the defendant.107
Therefore, to properly vindicate the rights of a discriminatee, he
should have the benefits of a de novo judicial hearing on the merits
of his discrimination claim. Since the Kremer decision works to
effectively preclude such a hearing in 4 number of circumstances,
the issue should be reconsidered giving weight to the arguments
propounded by the dissent.
Douglas R. Hart '84
105. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
106. See also Jackson, supra note 4.
107. See Comment, Employment Discrimination-State Judicial Procedure Fore-
closes Federal Remedy Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Mitchell v. N.B.C., 31 RUTGERS
L. REV. 973, 992-93 (1979).
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